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A B S T R A C T
Support to energy, particularly hydropower, has formed an important element of many donor programmes. How
have such interventions shaped the emergence of particular energy imaginaries in the countries engaged with?
‘Energy imaginaries’ can be understood as the set of institutions, logics, values, and visions that spur ideas
around what sources of energy and forms of energy governance best foster development. Adopting a historical
and comparative perspective and drawing on the notion of ‘transnational assemblages’, we explore the nature of
energy aid interventions and the dynamic shifts of specific actors and discourses in bilateral relations. We focus
on Norway, a leading player in energy support, and two of its long-term partner countries, Nepal and Tanzania.
Through document analysis and interviews with key actors, we trace how Norwegian energy transnational as-
semblages have formed part of evolving energy imaginaries in Nepal and Tanzania in radically diverging ways.
In Nepal, dominated by an energy imaginary of hydropower as ‘white gold’, efforts to foster a bottom-up-driven
indigent energy sector were eclipsed by an emphasis on facilitating privatisation, resulting in a chaotic frag-
mentation of the energy landscape. In Tanzania, the donor-state energy imaginaries were centred on grandiose
projects of hydropowered industrialisation bound for failure, but later revived as part of an authoritarian project.
The study untangles a history of changing and partially conflicting discourses, offering a richer and more
nuanced understanding than studies focused on single projects or policies. We highlight how the idea of
transnational assemblages can be useful in understanding shifting imaginaries of energy development.
1. Introduction
The rise of particular energy imaginaries is shaped by shifting socio-
economic, political, ideological and environmental dynamics and
dominant values, logics, and contingencies. Energy imaginaries refer to
shared ideas about a country's “place in the world and its modernising
passage from past to future” [1, p. 6]. How energy is produced, dis-
tributed, and supplied can take a myriad of different forms, depending
on the nature of the energy source and the institutional structures
governing its production, transmission, and supply. Approaches range
from localised and small-scale community-based strategies to grandiose
projects moulded on ideas of modernisation and industrialisation, with
differing emphasis on the relative roles of the state, communities, and
the private sector. The concept of energy imaginaries captures the no-
tion that energy is not just about technological systems, it is funda-
mentally a socio-cultural and political project, incorporating the social
and physical production of energy across “types, sources, places, and
time” [2, p. 2]. It provides a different understanding to energy systems
analysis, focusing more on a human-centred approach to understand
energy projects [3].
Energy is a key dimension of development, and donors have played
a significant part in supporting energy projects and sectoral reforms in
developing countries, although aid flows have fluctuated over time [4].
While access to affordable energy is now firmly embedded in the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDG7), until recently, global policy efforts
in energy development have ignored how energy governance could be
geared towards the needs of the poor [5–7]. It is here that the idea of
energy imaginaries is useful in the sense that it forces us to explicitly
consider the social and political aspects of energy systems, and shared
conceptions of social meanings [Castoriadis 1975, cited in 8, p. 137].
Future imaginaries are not neutral constructs, they are framed in a
certain way, with some actors having more power than others to project
their imaginations [9], shaping future governance and societal condi-
tions [10]. Like utopias, visions of energy futures are “trapped within
the imaginative potentials and resources available in the contemporary
socioeconomic system” [Kuchler 2014, cited in 8, p. 138]. Thus,
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imaginaries rarely represent radical departures from the past, as the
representations and materialities of past and present tend to frame so-
cieties’ visions of the future in profound ways [8].
Scant explicit attention has been paid to the question of how energy
imaginaries in developing countries have been shaped through donor
interventions and influence, which is what this article sets out to ad-
dress. In responding to this question, we seek to historicise the emer-
gence of energy imaginaries in developing countries through studying
the intersections of energy development, the politics of aid, and neo-
liberal transformations, from a comparative perspective. We do this
through focusing on a three-country case study involving Norway,
Nepal, and Tanzania, aiming to shed light on the complex interlinkages
between energy imaginaries, energy infrastructures, and the political
economy of development aid. While the ‘global form’ of neoliberalism
[11] gripped all three countries in the early 1990s, it played out in
markedly different ways, partly due to the contingent nature of the
assemblages present in each context.
Much of the literature on aid and energy development has focused
on specific projects [4, 12], but less attention has been devoted to
comparative approaches that elucidate the divergences of energy de-
velopment policy and practices in different settings over time, and how
these have meshed with existing thinking and institutional frameworks.
Hence, while there is a rich literature on specific development projects,
most of these studies tend to take a short-term agency focus. This points
to the need, as suggested by Gilman [13, p. 5] for a historiographical
approach to the study of development that combines a variety of
methods and sources to “compose narratives that connect theory,
policy, and action, and to do so comparatively”. This call is echoed by
Nusser [14] in the context of large dams, as he argues that the trans-
formation of fluvial environments is seldom framed within the broader
picture of contested development paradigms across changing historical,
political, and spatial contexts. Moreover, with regard to analysing
macro development processes – such as the relative roles of states and
markets in development trends – Mahoney [15] points to the power of
comparative-historical analysis. More generally, Hirsh and Jones [16]
highlight the value of historical approaches in energy research, in
particular to identify the essential role of social and cultural con-
siderations in shaping the successes and failures of energy regimes.
Norway, a fully electrified country relying entirely on hydropower,
has a long history of providing aid to developing countries for energy
development, particularly hydropower. It has sustained long-term aid
relations with two key partner countries, Nepal and Tanzania, since the
1960s. We sought to critically engage with and understand the ways in
which the interventions in these two strategic partner countries con-
tributed to the emergence and co-production of national energy ima-
ginaries. This involved accommodating a complex set of actors and
discourses operating across temporal and spatial scales. We found that
conceptualising these sets of actors and discourses as assemblages was
helpful in getting to grips with how these have shaped specific ideas
and framings of energy over time.
We have structured the article as follows. In Section 2, we flesh out
in more detail the key concepts of energy imaginaries and assemblages,
and Section 3 describes the methodological approach of the research.
We then go on to provide a brief overview of the Norwegian landscape
of actors and discourses in aid and energy in Section 4, before moving
on to focus on the rich stories of shifting assemblages and emerging
energy imaginaries in Nepal and Tanzania in Sections 5 and 6 respec-
tively. We compare and contrast these findings in Section 7, before
rounding off with some concluding reflections in Section 8.
2. Energy imaginaries and transnational assemblages: a long-term
comparative approach
Our analytical approach combines a focus on the emergence of
particular energy imaginaries with mapping out shifting transnational
energy aid assemblages in a long-term comparative perspective. Energy
imaginaries draw on the work done on socio-technical imaginaries,
which can be defined as “collectively imagined forms of social life and
social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific
scientific and/or technological projects” [17, p. 119]. Energy imagin-
aries are intimately connected with the materiality of infrastructures
and energy resources, and thinking about imaginaries is helpful in de-
naturalising spatial relations that are often seen as fixed, as well as
reflecting on questions of national identities [1, 18]. They are shaped by
the sets of institutions, logics, values, and visions, giving rise to specific
ideas around what sources of energy and forms of energy governance
are the most optimal in terms of bringing about development (ibid.).
Studying how diverse framings of energy futures emerge and jostle
for space is useful in that it brings to light how imaginaries arise and
gain traction, and what the drivers of such imaginaries are [19]. The
agendas and actions of international aid organisations and other actors,
financial models, and resources for implementation will potentially
influence government policies. It is through such interactions that
particular energy discourses and practices are made “material, natur-
alised, and reified” [18, p. 264]. However, while the literature on en-
ergy imaginaries points to these complex sets of policies, actors, and
institutions influencing the emergence of such imaginaries, there ap-
pears to be little explicit attention to how donor interventions have
shaped and co-produced such collective visions.
The broader field of donor-recipient relations has received in-
creasing attention over the past few years, with ethnographic studies of
specific aid projects bringing to light the complexity of interactions and
outcomes. While the anthropology of development literature offers rich
empirical descriptions of the politics of development project actors [see
for example 20, 21], there is still a tendency, in the strands of literature
dealing more directly with aid negotiations, to portray the negotiating
parties as monolithic entities. This is reflected, for instance, in the terms
used to describe asymmetries of power between donors and recipients,
with negotiating capital for donors and extraversion for recipients [22,
23].
In order to avoid such monolithic entities, we find it useful to draw
on the notion of assemblages. Assemblages can be conceived of as
“constructionist account[s] of social-spatial relations” [24, p. 125], and
as “material, collective and discursive relationships” [25, p. 4]. The
idea of assemblages is reminiscent of ‘collections’, or ‘collages’, but it
also involves active practice, that is, the ‘activity of assembling’. For
example, in her work on community forestry management, Tania
Murray Li focuses on the practices of assemblage, the bringing together
of diverse elements of discourses, institutions, forms of expertise, and
social groups, and how these different elements of assemblages are
made (or not) to cohere [26]. What makes assemblages so appealing is
the associated conception of power as “multiple co-existences” [27, p.
562], perceiving power as distributed, rather than centralised, raising
questions about where causality and responsibility are situated [24, p.
125].
While ‘assemblage’ as a concept can be traced back to the work of
Deleuze and Guattari [28], see also DeLanda [29], the sense in which it
is used in this context is more as a desciptor [24]. Assemblage is an
attractive idea, as it is so malleable [24], and it has been deployed in a
diversity of ways. For instance, the idea of ‘global assemblages’ re-
presents a composite term that focuses on the specificities of global
forms in particular sites. Global forms can include, for example, neo-
liberalism, international regulations and standards, the nation, class,
citizenship, democracy, or certain ethical problems [25, 27]. The notion
of global assemblages offers an alternative to the binaries inherent in
the categories of local and global, providing a way to eschew the bin-
aries of ‘globalisation’ versus ‘the national’ [11], see also Siakwah's [30]
work on globalised assemblages in Ghana's petroleum industry.
McFarlane, in his work on social movements, coins the term ‘translocal
assemblages’ to bypass what he sees as the scalar dissociation between
local and global [27].
For the purpose of our study, we suggest that the term ‘transnational
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assemblages’ can be usefully deployed to describe assemblages that
comprise bilateral relations between actors situated in specific coun-
tries, but that are embedded within a context of global discursive
trends. While global assemblages focus on how global forms are ar-
ticulated in specific settings, and translocal assemblages explores the
ways in which assemblages are constituted in specific localities, the
notion of transnational assemblages captures the dynamic shifts of
specific actors and discourses in bilateral relations – in our case,
Norway-Nepal and Norway-Tanzania. These relations are embedded in
larger discourses on aid, energy, and development, and global forms
such as neoliberalism.
3. Methods
We adopted a mixed-methods approach, drawing on a combination
of extensive reading of policy documents and grey literature, as well as
semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and workshops. The
policy documents and grey literature formed a key part of our research
material. In Norway, we searched for country-specific information on
the websites of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(Norad), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy, the Directorate of Water Resources and Energy, and the par-
liamentary archives for relevant documentation on development and
energy policy. A number of white papers have been produced over the
years pertaining to development policies, and we carefully read through
those that were most relevant, eight white papers in total. We were also
given access to a cache of unpublished internal travel reports from
Tanzania and Nepal by former Norad staff working on energy devel-
opment, eight such travel reports in total.
To trace the evolution of energy policy, we searched out the most
relevant documentation relating to both domestic policies and inter-
national development, such as the Clean Energy Initiative launched by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007, and the Energy+ Initiative
launched in 2011, as well as energy-related regulations and legislation.
We meticulously read these texts, paying attention to the framings they
contained about energy and development relations. In Nepal, we went
through the relevant legislation and policy documents, including the
1992 Electricity Act, the 2001 Hydropower Development Policy, the
2006 Renewable Energy Policy, the 2013 National Energy Strategy, and
the 2016 Subsidy Policy for Renewable Energy. We did the same thing
for Tanzania, paying particular attention to the 2003 National Energy
Policy and the Electricity Supply Industry Reform Strategy and
Roadmap 2014–2025, as well as relevant reports and material that we
sourced from NGOs working within the energy sector.
Another key source of information was semi-structured interviews
with relevant actors within the aid and energy sectors. In Norway, we
conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 people. These included
six Norad employees (two of whom are former employees), one em-
ployee from the Directorate of Water Resources and Energy (who were
involved in projects in Nepal), one independent energy consultant (who
had worked in both Nepal and Tanzania), two former Statkraft em-
ployees, a journalist writing for a development-oriented magazine
which also covers energy projects, and two representatives from energy
NGOs.
In Tanzania we interviewed three staff from the Ministry of Energy
and Minerals, two employees from Tanesco, one from the Pangani
Water Basin Office, two people from an NGO working to promote re-
newable energy, as well as two energy advisers from the Norwegian
embassy (one current and one former adviser). In Nepal we interviewed
two staff members in the Ministry of Energy, one employee from the
National Energy Authority (NEA), one employee from the association of
independent power producers, one employee from Himal Power, and an
adviser from the Norwegian embassy in Kathmandu.
Two energy development projects of roughly the same size and built
around the same time were selected to enable us to gain a more in-
depth understanding of how these specific projects reflect the particular
logics of development interventions and how these intersect with na-
tional policies, agendas, and framings. The cases selected were Khimti
in Nepal, and Pangani in Tanzania. These were both medium-size (60
MW) and were built in the mid-1990s. Repeated field trips were orga-
nised to each of these sites during 2015 and 2016, where we conducted
focus group discussions with villagers living in the vicinity of both
projects. We sought out people who had been involved in the con-
struction and management of the projects on the Norwegian, Tanzanian
and Nepali sides, and conducted semi-structured interviews with the
managers and engineers (most of whom were no longer in their original
positions). We did four such interviews in Nepal and three in Tanzania.
We also organised two workshops, one in Kathmandu in September
2016 and one in Dar es Salaam in August 2017. The purpose of these
workshops was to elicit different actors’ experiences, perceptions and
perspectives on energy imaginaries, bringing together people from state
agencies, NGOs, donor agencies, civil society, as well as academics, to
discuss energy and development relations and what they considered to
be the most pressing issues and concerns. The workshops started off
with invited presentations from participants, before moving on to dis-
cuss key questions pertaining to energy and development issues, and
visions for the future. The workshop in Nepal was attended by about 20
people, including people from the Ministry of Energy, NEA, NGOs, and
donor representatives. In Tanzania, there were about 25 people, in-
cluding representatives from Tanesco, the Pangani Water Basin Office,
and the University of Dar es Salaam. Both country teams were re-
presented at both workshops, thus facilitating comparison and reflec-
tion on contrasts, as well as the exchange of experiences.
4. The evolving landscape of aid and energy in Norway
4.1. From rags to energy riches
Norway's history of hydropower development has shaped its own
imaginaries on development co-operation. The country is a high-vo-
lume energy producer and consumer, practically all of it derived from
hydropower, and hydropower has always occupied a central place in
the national psyche [31]. There are currently 1 393 hydropower in-
stallations in the country, of which 36 are more than 200 MW and the
annual total electricity production is about 146 TWh.1 In the early
1900s, access to abundant, inexpensive energy became a key driver of
the country's industrial development and modernisation efforts. From
the initial small-scale efforts, consisting basic run-of-river projects
powering local grain mills, schemes gradually grew in scale. Some of
the world's biggest hydropower projects were built in this period, to
fuel the budding chemical and aluminium industries, and in the post-
war era, access to energy for households became an important priority.
The dominant idea guiding hydropower development in the post-war
period was one of a state-guided, hydropowered industrialisation to
mould a modern state [31]. The discovery of North Sea oil in 1969 set
Norway on the path to petroleum riches, transforming it into a wealthy,
oil-exporting welfare state. While oil and gas have since become an
important element of energy politics, the focus in this paper is mainly
on Norway as a hydropower nation.
The country's dependence on hydropower spawned educational in-
stitutions and entrepreneurial initiatives. A technical college was es-
tablished in Trondheim to serve as a hub for technology innovation,
setting up a hydropower laboratory and creating a vibrant environment
for directed research and development. This initiative generated ex-
tensive networks of expertise which laid the foundations for a diversity
of specialist engineering companies that would later become engaged in
development projects abroad.
Norway began taking on the mantle of an aid provider in the 1950s
and 1960s. In 1962, an independent agency was set up for development
1 https://www.nve.no/energiforsyning/kraftproduksjon/?ref=mainmenu
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co-operation, known since 1968 as the Norwegian Agency for
Development Co-operation (Norad). The relationship between the
Government of Norway and countries with which it co-operates has
traditionally been one where the embassies and aid agencies followed
in the wake of early Norwegian missionaries. From 2004, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and national embassies were tasked with the overall
responsibility of day-to-day management of bilateral and multilateral
aid, with Norad serving mainly as an advisory body.
4.2. Shifting energy aid assemblages
While the former colonial powers became aid providers to their
erstwhile colonies, the government of Norway prided itself on its lack of
a colonial past, which, in its own opinion, made it particularly suited as
a donor [32]. In the early years, the emphasis was on strengthening the
sense of being a ‘good Samaritan’ through the transfer of knowledge,
capital, and improved technologies. However, the lack of tangible re-
sults from the broad range of aid projects led to something of an ex-
istential crisis in the aid industry at the end of the 1980s, and the focus
shifted to the institutions in the recipient countries themselves. ‘Good
governance’ became a ubiquitous buzzword [33]. According to a former
Norad employee “there was a shift towards reforming institutions and
then expecting economic growth and democracy to follow in the wake
of such efforts” (interview, March 2016).
While the aid discourse in the first couple of decades had tended to
be couched in terms of idealistic notions of altruism and state-to-state
support, the publication of two reports in the early 1990s that con-
sidered the potential of private sector engagement in aid created a stir
in Norwegian policy circles.2 Essentially, the reports argued that Nor-
wegian aid should be conducted in a way that was compatible with
creating opportunities for Norwegian companies in developing country
contexts. Companies could be supported through mixed credits, and
there was a strong emphasis on the idea that Norway should con-
centrate on areas where it had specific competence. The commissioning
of these reports coincided with a marked downturn in the Norwegian
economy, with companies increasingly looking towards the interna-
tional arena for potential new markets. This was certainly the case for
the hydropower sector, as the era of domestic big dam projects was
drawing to a close. Thus, the notion of Norway as a selfless provider of
aid gave way to a view that legitimised aid as serving both foreign
policy and business interests (interview with journalist for an in-
dependent development magazine, March 2016.).
The early 1990s saw a major liberalising of the domestic Norwegian
energy sector, and a concomitant shift in the political imagination of
the value of hydropower, shifting from an emphasis on hydropower as a
key element in promoting industrial development and securing national
welfare, to emphasising the monetary value of electricity as an abstract
commodity [31]. The state-owned commercial company Statkraft was
created in 1992.3 During the same period, interest in promoting energy
as a key development field kept mounting, and energy came to be re-
garded as fundamental to all aspects of development.
The early 2000s saw a flurry of policies and initiatives, including the
Clean Energy Initiative4 and the Energy+ initiative,5 which involved
Norwegian expertise, particularly in hydropower, increasingly being
viewed as an export commodity. The Clean Energy for Development
Initiative was launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007 and is
geared towards increasing access to renewable energy in developing
countries through a combination of grants and commercial investments.
The Energy+ Initiative was launched by the Norwegian Government at
a high-level conference in 2011 convened in co-operation with the In-
ternational Energy Agency, where the focus was on mobilising private
capital and public resources for energy access. The driver was to “create
more opportunities for renewable energy”, and concomitantly, to
“create commercial opportunities for Norwegian actors” (interview
with Energy Norway employee, February 2016). In December 2013,
Statkraft and Norfund, a development finance institution created in
1997 to finance investments in energy, signed a Transaction Agreement
to restructure and prolong their cooperation within the renewable en-
ergy sector. This led to the creation of a new company, SN Power AS.
Kjell Roland, Norfund's director at the time, spoke of a revolution in
energy aid [34]. These assemblages of institutions, beliefs and practices
were emerging through the merging of aid and private sector interests,
facilitated by a rapprochement between aid bureaucrats and con-
sultants.
The form of the energy-aid transnational assemblages thus morphed
into a very different shape, reflecting the global trends that shifted
focus away from traditional donor-recipient aid relations to privilege
ideas of partnership and investment. The practices within conventional
development projects changed, becoming preoccupied with reporting
procedures rather than getting to know local contexts – “now it's all
about reporting results, and I think the consultancy sector is gaining too
much clout within the aid industry” (interview with former Norad
employee, March 2016).
Having briefly described the Norwegian landscape of shifting en-
ergy-aid assemblages, we now turn to the country contexts of Nepal and
Tanzania, exploring how the assemblages of Norwegian actors and
discourses became entangled in the emergence of particular imaginaries
and pathways of energy development within the spaces shaped by local
political contexts and institutions.
5. Energy imaginaries in Nepal
Hydropower has played a prominent part in Nepal's imagination of
energy futures. A particularly powerful idea was the image of hydro-
power as ‘white gold’, a term coined by a Swiss geographer visiting
Nepal in the 1950s [35]. This imaginary referred to how the country's
rich water resources could serve as an export-oriented revenue-gen-
erating mechanism to put the country on a path to prosperity; and co-
existed with ideas and initiatives of smaller-scale, bottom-up driven
hydropower development initiatives. The ‘white gold’ imaginary pro-
vided a sense of national unity and of Nepal as a hydropower nation,
but its potential state-constructing ethos was eroded over time by the
fracturing of the energy landscape, triggered through donor-led efforts
to liberalise the sector.
5.1. Overview
Nepal lies squeezed between two neighbouring giants, China to the
northeast, and India to the southwest. The Rana dynasty ruled the re-
gion for centuries, but in 1960 the Panchayat system was introduced, a
structure of party-less self-governance where people could elect their
own representatives, but with executive power residing in the hands of
the monarch, King Mahendra. The 1990s marked the beginning of
2 The first report, entitled ‘Aid and Business’ was penned by Borger A. Lenth,
the Director of Eksportfinans, and presented to the Minister for Development in
March 1990. The second report was produced by Einar Risa in 1992 and was
titled ‘Report to the Minister of Development from the Association for Aid and
Business’ (both titles are authors’ translation). Risa was then State Secretary for
development affairs, on leave from Statoil. See Kielland (2008) for details on
the reports. E. Kielland, Norsk bistand og næringslivet – fra motkonjunkturtiltak
til konjunkturuavhengig samarbeid, Masteroppgave ved Institutt for statsvi-
tenskap, University of Oslo, Oslo, 2008.
3 It had two divisions – Statkraft for the generation of energy, and Statnett for
the bulk transmission of energy
4 https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/energy/clean-energy/
(footnote continued)
clean-energy-for-development-initiative/
5 http://sdg.iisd.org/news/norway-launches-energy-initiative-at-energy-for-
all-conference/
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democracy, which lasted until the 2001 royal massacre,6 ushering in a
new regime and the direct rule of King Gyanendra until 2006. From
then on, the political landscape has been in constant turmoil, domi-
nated by people's movements and constitutional reforms [36].
Foreign aid has played a key role in Nepal. During the 1950s and
1960s, aid and advice from around the world started to pour into the
country, a trickle at first, then a torrent [37, 38]. Some donors, such as
the US and the USSR, had a geopolitical interest in the early Cold War
in supporting Nepal – the US wanted to contain communist China, and
both the US and USSR sought to influence India. Aid flows, including
for hydropower, dwindled in the 1970s in response to Nepal's declining
geopolitical importance during the détente period, and international
lenders like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
moved in to fill the gap. After a dip, aid dependency increased from
34% of the national budget in the mid-1970s to almost 70% in the mid-
1990s [35]. Nepal remains one of the least developed countries in the
world, with aid still accounting for roughly half the nation's develop-
ment expenditure (ibid.), with 80% of the country's population de-
pending on biomass to meet their energy needs [39].
5.2. Hydropower in Nepal and Norwegian involvement
In 1967 it was estimated that the rivers in Nepal could theoretically
generate 83 000 MW of electricity [40, p. 75]. That figure is something
every Nepali schoolchild knows by heart, instilling in them the sense of
being a citizen of a hydropower nation [41]. Thus, the enormity of this
potential not only grips the minds of the political elite, but also fuels the
popular imagination, with hydropower being hailed as a guarantee for
Nepal's future prosperity. Such visions of an inevitable hydropower
future “are important technologies of government that might unify a
fractured nation-state” [41, p. 147]. A model of export-led growth
caught hold, premised on exporting electricity to the northern state of
India to power irrigation pumps and nascent industrial development.
In order to fulfil this imaginary, the Government of Nepal was fi-
nancially dependant on international donors and consultants to do the
necessary feasibility studies. In addition to the projects commissioned
to facilitate export of electricity to India, there were also more ad hoc
state-led projects, in which foreign donors and companies were brought
in to build plants that would supply power to the capital, Kathmandu,
and some other major cities (such as Pokhara and Lalitpur). However,
most of these interventions were carried out without reflecting on how
hydropower would bring about development in the region. The projects
were planned, designed and managed in a top-down fashion, paying
scant attention to building local capacity or thinking about how the
energy could be put to productive use [35].
In the early 1960s, while most international and bilateral donors
with an interest in Nepal were involved in these large-scale projects, a
small Norwegian faith-based organisation supported by Norad, the
United Mission to Nepal (UMN), began its work. Throughout the 1960s,
70 s and 80 s, the Mission – and its champion, Odd Hoftun – strived to
build local capacity to create an indigenous hydropower industry, mi-
micking in certain ways the early phases of hydropower's role in
Norwegian state-building. Hoftun helped to establish the Butwal
Technical Institute, forging links with technical education institutions
in Norway, described in the preceding section. The Institute provided
village boys with skills and self-discipline to devise their own hydro-
power projects, making use of local materials and techniques, and es-
tablishing a locally owned company in the process, the Butwal Power
Company (BPC). These efforts paid off, and several small-scale hydro-
power plants were successfully built to provide local communities and
small industries with power [42]. There were other government-led
attempts to develop small-scale and micro-hydro projects to serve set-
tlements in rural areas in the 1970s, but these initiatives did not prove
long-lasting, however, and soon faded out [35].
5.3. Policy rupture: privatisation gains ground
The start of the 1990s marked a political shift in Nepal, with the
reinstatement of multiparty democracy and parliamentary elections in
1991. The new government's discourse underscored the importance of
promoting hydropower-led development and closing the energy deficit
– Nepal's installed capacity at the time was a mere 245 MW, serving
about 8% of the population [35].
This discourse contributed to an energy imaginary about achieving
greater energy independence from India, thus promoting Nepalese
identity and nation-building [42]. The former secretary of water re-
sources approached Hoftun and asked him if the Butwal Power Com-
pany could build a project on the Khimti river, on a larger scale than the
three small-scale projects that had already been completed. The onus of
securing finance, technology and management support from Norad fell
on Hoftun. The secretary's request reflected that there had been little
institutional learning from the projects built by international con-
tractors during the earlier decades [35]. Since the scale of the task was
going to be too much for the local company BPC to take on alone,
Hoftun approached the Norwegian state-owned company Statkraft to
ask for help.
As described in the previous section, the early 1990s was a time of
liberalisation reforms in the Norwegian energy sector, and a con-
comitant shift in thinking around hydropower towards perceiving it
more in terms of an abstract commodity [31]. These reforms meant that
it was not possible to finance the Khimti project using public funds, and
private financing would have to be sought. Hoftun's negotiations with
Statkraft were difficult, as one of their preconditions was the creation of
an appropriate legal framework. The Nepal Energy Authority (NEA)
had been used to negotiating with Norad, but now they were faced with
Statkraft's hard-nosed corporate lawyers, and they had little clue how to
handle the situation. The negotiations were arduous, according to one
of the team members (interview with employee of the Directorate of
Energy and Water Resources, March 2016).
Eventually, the Nepalese Electricity Act was promulgated in 1992,
mimicking energy regulatory reforms in Norway and paving the way for
the Khimti project. A new company, Himal Power, was created solely
for the purpose of owning and operating the run-of-river, 60 MW pro-
ject, with the BPC and Statkraft as its main shareholders.7 Two further
small projects, which drew on the strong traditions of community
management in Nepal, were built to provide off-grid electricity for the
adjacent villages, with the Khimti Rural Electric Cooperative (KREC),
formed in 2004. Norad funded the village electrification schemes, and
also supported the project with some 230 million, as well as guaran-
teeing the Norwegian export credits.
The international lenders set strict conditions, which put Himal
Power Limited (HPL) under severe pressure (interview with HPL em-
ployee, November 2016). Because it was viewed as a high-risk, com-
mercial operation, the tariffs were steep, and the Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA) stipulated that NEA should pay for the electricity
provided in USD (interview with HPL employee, November 2016). NEA
later tried to renegotiate the agreement, even as late as 2014, but did
not succeed. NEA buys the electricity at market rates, but then sells it at
a flat, subsidised rate, as there is little political interest in charging
market prices for electricity [43]. The discrepancy is borne by NEA,
6 On 1 June 2001, Crown Prince Dipendra shot and killed ten members of the
Nepalese monarchy, including his father King Birendra, and his mother, Queen
Aishwarya, and then shot himself in the head. He later died from his head
wounds, and his brother, Gyanendra, acceded the throne.
7 The initial shareholding structure was Statkraft 73%, Butwal Power
Company (BPC) 17% and ABB (now Alstom Power) and Kværner (now GE
Energy) 5% each. The current shareholders are Statkraft, Bergenshalvøens
Kommunal Kraftselskap (BKK) and BPC.
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thus exacerbating the huge deficit it already carries due to management
challenges and allegations of corruption (ibid.). In some ways, this re-
flects the illusion of the Norwegian shift in energy imaginaries towards
viewing electricity mainly as a commodity, and of regulatory reforms
that were premised on market conditions detached from political rea-
lities.
Khimti became the first privately owned hydropower project in
Nepal, and it marked a major shift in attitudes towards energy devel-
opment. Whereas Norad had funded Hoftun's work through conven-
tional grants, there was now a more commercial approach, with an
accompanying emphasis on the long-term financial viability of energy
projects.8 There was irritation amongst Nepalese bureaucrats too, re-
garding the sudden change of tune from their Norwegian partners. In
conceptualising plans for hydropower development, the major donors
did not consider lessons that the bottom-up approach could have pro-
vided for the sector and Nepal's development. If there had been closer
co-operation and willingness to learn, Nepal could have had two dec-
ades of lead-time to build a more resilient imaginary of an indigenous
hydropower sector that could have helped the country on its develop-
ment path [35].
5.4. Fragmentation and chaotic pluralism
Following this ‘triggering moment’ and having opened up for the
entry of private actors through putting into place a privatisation-
friendly legal framework, the Nepali Government soon began pushing
privatisation of its own accord. Following the 1992 Electricity Act,
there was a burst of activity in formulating new energy policies and
enactments on existing policies. The Hydropower Development Policy
was published in 2001, followed by a Renewable Energy Policy in 2006.
In 2013 came the National Energy Strategy, and in 2016 a Subsidy
Policy for Renewable Energy. Hydro had become ‘hot’amongs local
investors, and many of the companies listed on the Kathmandu stock
exchange were hydro companies. Some project-affected communities,
such as those in the Upper Tamakoshi area, were offered the opportu-
nity to purchase a piece of the hydropower future via initial public
offerings [41]. There is a lot of speculation in shares, without people
necessarily appreciating the risks involved (stakeholder interviews,
project workshop in Kathmandu, September 2016), fuelling a potent
‘hydro hype’ [35]. According to the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA),
Nepal currently has a total installed capacity of about 746 MW from
hydropower, with about 26 MW produced by mini- and micro-hydro
plants. Electricity accounts for only about 1,5% of energy supply, with
the mainstay of energy needs (about 75%) being covered by fuelwood.
The remainder is made up of petroleum products, animal waste, and
agricultural residues [44].
The imaginary of hydropower as ‘white gold’ that could have served
as a force to potentially unify a struggling and fractured state, was thus
turned into a vehicle for its further fracturing. Efforts to build an in-
digent hydropower sector were eclipsed by approaches that tried to
deal with the problems of what they perceived to be a bloated and
ineffective state bureaucracy, through emphasising private investment
and electricity as an abstract commodity. This reflected the reframing
and reforms being rolled out in Norway in the early 1990s, where hy-
dropower went from playing the role of undergirding the construction
of an inclusive welfare state to being viewed mainly in terms of its
monetary value.
While the energy imaginary of hydropower as ‘white gold’ remained
strong, its potential role as a state-building force morphed into be-
coming mainly an emblem of export-oriented revenue generation,
fuelled by private investments. The export-oriented model was sup-
ported by the Norwegian embassy through co-funding the building of
high-voltage transmission lines between Nepal and India. Statkraft was
involved in the 650 MW Tamakoshi III project in 2016. However, the
company eventually withdrew from the project, due to, amongst other
things, uncertainty linked to the potential to export energy to India.
While many foreigners are today withdrawing from Nepal due to the
instability of the political regime, India and China continue to vie for
influence in the country.
6. Energy imaginaries in Tanzania
Energy imaginaries in post-colonial Tanzania were heavily influ-
enced by ideas of state-led, large-scale hydropower development, or
‘hydropowered industrialisation’. Dams were striking symbols of the
power of the state to direct its own course of development in the early
years of African independence [45]. Leaders of socialist post-colonial
states, such as Nkrumah in Ghana and Nyerere in Tanzania, looked to
the nation's rivers to solidify their political power and foster economic
development [46].
6.1. Overview
Tanganyika became independent in 1961,9 with the charismatic
Julius Nyerere taking the helm as the country's first president. He was
to dominate Tanzanian politics for more than two decades, attempting
to fashion an African version of socialism. His 1967 Arusha Declaration
set out in broad terms a new vision for rural development, emphasising
self-reliance and the settling of people into village co-operatives, a
policy known as ujamaa (familyhood) [47, 48]. The implementation of
this development strategy relied on the installation of a powerful state,
controlled by the bureaucracy and a single dominant party [49].
However, although Nyerere was sincerely committed to improving the
condition of the peasantry, his legacy is ambivalent. The practice of
ujamaa was deeply problematic as it relied on coercion and forceful
resettlements, rather than voluntarism. The tension between partici-
patory empowerment, as emphasised by the president in his speeches,
and state authority was resolved in favour of the latter [50].
Following the financial crisis in 1983–85, Tanzania completely re-
versed Nyerere's socialist policies over the following decade [51]. The
World Bank and the IMF imposed economic reforms and liberalisation
as conditions for loans, and aid conditionality became the order of the
day [52]. While the country became a multi-party democracy in 1992,
it has remained dominated by the major party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi
[53]. The current president, John Magufuli, has vowed to crack down
on corruption and reduce the dependency on aid, and while he was
initially credited for his tough stance on graft, he is increasingly being
criticised for his authoritarian style [54].
6.2. Energy development and Norwegian engagement
In the decades after independence, Tanzania engaged in efforts to
generate electricity, mostly diesel-based, setting up the Tanzania
Electric Supply Company (Tanesco) in 1975. The expansion of the na-
tional electric grid was made possible through “violent state-making
projects enacted by Tanzania's early political leaders who were inspired
by colonial logics” [55, p. 12]. For Nyerere, village living, development
services, sedentary agriculture and mechanisation, coupled with power
generation and industrialisation, became a single indissoluble idea of
his newly-independent Tanzania [55, 56].
Surveys in the early 1960s by FAO and the US Bureau of
Reclamation had suggested that there could be great potential in
8 The law guaranteed the return of responsibility for operating the power
plant to the national government after a certain period. There was also an
emphasis on building technical competence and awareness of environmental
issues.
9 The country became Tanzania upon entering into a union with Zanzibar in
1964.
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developing the Rufiji River, one of the country's main hydrological
resources. In the mid-1960s Tanzanian planners visited the US to wit-
ness the wonders of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), seen as a
model of river-basin development at the time [57]. Thus,interest in-
creased in the potential of hydropower, reflecting a faith that power
produced by dams would spur industrial development. The country's
second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development stated that
“The expansion of power supplies is a necessary ingredient for such
development” [46, p. 249]. Thus, the Stiegler's Gorge project was
conceived, a grandiose 2 100 MW scheme on the Rufiji River, hailed by
the Tanzanian Government as a symbol of modernity and a cornerstone
of the country's industrialisation plan [United Republic of Tanzania,
1969, ctied in 46, p. 149]. As the Volta River project had been Nkru-
mah's vision of transforming his country into a modern industrialised
nation, so the Stiegler's Gorge project became Nyerere's dream [46, 58],
consolidating an energy imaginary of hydropowered industrialisation.
As US interest in funding the project waned due to the increasing
antipathy towards Nyerere's socialist ideas, the Norwegians readily
stepped into the fray [46]. They were attracted by an opportunity to
export the expertise of their own hydropower consultants and share
their experiences and imaginaries of large-scale dam building to power
industry. The socialist ideals of the Tanzanian leader were an additional
attraction which chimed well with Norwegian ideals of a strong state
[46, 58, 59]. Nyerere was well aware of the role of hydropower in
Norway's history of becoming a modern industrialised welfare state.
There had been close links between Nyerere and some of the Nordic
social democrats in the 1960s and 1970s [52].
Tanzania occupied a significant space in Norwegian bilateral aid
relations, While some of the staff working for Norad at the time began
raising concerns about human rights issues – particularly in relation to
the ujamaa policy – the will to believe in Nyerere's policies and images
of the future was so powerful on the political left that such warnings
went unheeded [52, 60]. This infatuation resulted in an assortment of
Norwegian and Scandinavian actors in Tanzania [52, 60], including
Norad bureaucrats, experts, and ambassadors, as well as NGOs and
consultancy companies. Norad set up a local office in Dar es Salaam in
1968, and an embassy was established in 1975. Norad introduced a
system of resident representatives which lasted for a period of around
twenty years before being phased out in the early 1990s [61].
The emphasis was on providing electricity for industry to promote
hydropowered industrialisation, such as Norway itself had experienced.
Thus the focus of the Stiegler's project centred on maximising power
production, rather than flood control or irrigation [46]. In fact, the
World Bank had done a feasibility study and found the project to be
unrealistic, a study that Norad was not aware of. Norad went ahead and
financed a feasibility study of its own, carried out in 1973 by Norcon-
sult, a Norwegian consultancy company, and the project kept lumbering
on, running up costs to the tune of about 150 million NOK before finally
being terminated in 1981 [52, 58].
In the meantime, the Great Ruaha Power Project, conceived by
Tanesco, Sida (the Swedish equivalent of Norad) and the World Bank,
resulted in building the smaller-scale Kidatu and Mtera reservoirs on
the Ruaha River, which were completed in 1980 [62]. Further hydro-
power projects were not proposed until the early 1990s, notably the
Pangani Falls Redevelopment Project, finalised in 1995. Pangani was a
medium-sized 60 MW, 100 million NOK project funded by three Nordic
donors, Norad, Finnida (the Finnish aid agency), and Sida, with Norad
footing the largest share of the bill. Norad further supported a Pro-
gramme for Upgrading Local Infrastructure and Services (PULIS), tar-
geted at the project-affected villages, building health centres, sanitation
facilities, and schools but with no provision for rural electricity. While
deemed successful at the time, the Pangani project soon ran into pro-
blems of water shortages due to seasonal variability and upstream ir-
rigation, which the mandatory creation of the Pangani River Basin
Authority could not solve. There was also the Kihansi project, upstream
on the Rufiji River, which was completed in 2000 [63].
6.3. Reforms and resistance
The 1990s saw Tanzania embarking on an extensive reform pro-
gramme [64]. At the behest of the World Bank, the electricity sector
was liberalised in 1992, with the formulation of the country's first en-
ergy policy, followed by a new electricity industry policy and re-
structuring framework in 1999. The major role that electricity came to
play in the country's development trajectory was brought to the fore in
the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025, which was forged by Tanza-
nia's third president, Benjamin Mkapa, in collaboration with foreign
supporters. The document emphasises the extension of the state's de-
velopment vision in transitioning from agriculture to electrified in-
dustry [55, 65].
However, while there was broad consensus around the importance
of electricity for development, there was more controversy around how
the energy sector was to be organised. The World Bank's Power Sector
VI Programme involved extensive corporatisation of the sector. The
2003 Energy Sector Policy thus emphasised competition and the state's
disengagement from energy production, in line with the standard un-
bundling model of separating production, transmission, and distribu-
tion. In the wake of this policy, two independent power providers were
created, Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) and Songas,
which were established in 2003 and 2004 respectively. A major cor-
ruption scandal surrounded IPTL, which became one of the most ex-
pensive projects of its kind [66, 67]. While Norad supported the World
Bank Power Sector Reform Programme through multilateral funding, it
was not actively involved. Indeed, travel reports from Norad staff at the
time reveal uneasiness at not being properly informed about what was
going on with the programme. There were doubts regarding the World
Bank's proposition to unbundle Tanesco, with one Norad staff member
remarking that it was ‘rash’ (interview with former Norad adviser,
March 2016).
The Tanzanian authorities had few alternatives but to accept the
package offered by the World Bank, and showed initial complacency;
but a quiet resistance was gaining momentum that resulted in the de-
specification of Tanesco in 2005. Plans around Tanesco's future were
revived in the Energy Roadmap published by the Ministry of Minerals
and Energy in 2014, and the current government's attitude to privati-
sation thus seems “deeply ambivalent” in the words of a former energy
adviser with the Norwegian embassy (interview, November 2017).
Despite efforts to reform and liberalise the energy sector, the socialist
past still shapes people's vision of development and energy imaginaries,
a point that was also expressed by several participants at the stake-
holder workshop we held in Dar es Salaam in September 2017.
6.4. The centrality of state control
Concomitant with the contested reform efforts, there was a reor-
ientation of Norwegian aid to the energy sector, shifting from infra-
structure projects to ‘softer’ approaches, such as strengthening state
institutional capacity and emphasising rural electrification. The Rural
Energy Agency (REA) and the Rural Energy Fund (REF) were set up in
2007 to promote energy access in rural areas, mainly through ex-
panding the central grid. There was an emphasis on continuing support
to Tanesco, though it was considered as being overly bureaucratic, in-
fective, and cumbersome, with the effectiveness of its support being
brought into question [68]. NGOs working in the sector, such as the
Tanzania Renewable Energy Association (TAREA), complained that “it
is very hard to offer alternative solutions and change the mindset of the
Agency people, who tend to be stuck in their old ways of thinking”
(TAREA staff member, personal communication, September 2017). Part
of the reason for the State's resistance to decentralised rural energy,
such as solar, might lie in the still-prevalent desire to make informal
pastoralist Maasai livelihoods ‘legible'', and to incorporate them into
formal economies through centralised electrification controlled by the
State [55].
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The reorientation of Norwegian aid was associated with a gradual
decline in the presence of Norwegian actors in Tanzania. The early
2000s saw major budget cuts, and Norwegian consultancy companies
have scaled down their activities. While the Norwegian embassy was
co-ordinating the work of many of the Western donors involved in
energy projects, and had a ‘good dialogue’ with Tanzanian authorities
on specific projects, they perceived the relations in terms of discussing
energy policy as ‘somewhat strained’, noting that their influence had
waned (interview with energy adviser, January 2017).
Meanwhile, there has been a return to large-scale planning and
constructing of energy generation by national authorities, through the
Power Sector Master Plans (PSMPs) which reflect the state's returned
leadership and ambition [69]. Visions for Tanzania's energy future are
articulated in the ‘Big Results Now’ policy (2012–2015), the Energy
Roadmap (2014), and the 2016 update of the Power Sector Master Plan.
The main objective set out in the Roadmap is to increase power gen-
eration capacity from about 1 583 MW to 10 000 MW by 2025 [70],
even though actual demand would likely be just a fraction of that [69].
While natural gas and coal make up the major part of the envisioned
increase, the vision involves a tripling of hydropower capacity, with
renewables, such as solar and wind, making up a mere 5%. This has
resulted in the resurrection of a number of formerly stalled dam pro-
jects, most prominent amongst these being the Stiegler's Gorge [69],
despite the misgivings expressed by former Minister of Energy and
Minerals, Sospeter Muhongo,10 towards hydropower due to problems of
unreliability (interview with energy adviser, January 2017).
It is thus possible to contend that there has been a revival of the
energy imaginary of large-scale ‘hydropowered industrialisation, taking
a cue from Ethiopia (arguably the leading dam-building country on the
continent). Magufuli has been eager to wean the country off Western
donors and consultants, and the project was finally awarded to a couple
of Egyptian companies [71]. Thus, while Norwegian actors were
heavily involved in the initial conceptions and planning shaping the
‘hydropowered industrialisation’ imaginary, the assemblage of actors
has changed.
The return of faith in large-scale energy projects and the revival of
the imaginary of ‘hydropowered industrialisation’ reflects a broader
trend of State developmentalism, often linked to the energy sector,
unfolding in many African countries [72]. Magufuli is an ardent ad-
vocate of state-led industrial development, and the resuscitation of the
Stiegler's Gorge project brings out how dams are “imbued with devel-
opmental potential, but their spectacle is seized upon as demonstrative
of progress, flagships for the government's ambition” [69, p. 7]. In
many ways, Magufuli has yet to break with the modernising tradition of
the past, and his political platform, kufufua viwanda (to revive the
factories), has become a “rallying cry for Tanzanians hoping to reap the
benefits of an industrial future” [55, p. 18]. Intriguingly, the Stiegler's
Gorge project is still based on the 1973 feasibility study done by Nor-
consult, highlighting how current energy imaginaries are shaped by
past practices.
7. A tale of two trajectories
As a backdrop, it is possible to discern three broad historical trends
in energy aid discourses. First, there was a phase during the early
decades of post-colonialism in the 1950s, 60 s and 70 s, when donors
were keen to support state-led efforts at building large-scale dams. The
enthusiasm for such hydraulic missions [73], which came to co-exist
with strategies favouring multiple forms of community-led energy
projects, and initiatives focusing on poverty alleviation and the bol-
stering of rural livelihoods through more bottom-up approaches [74,
75]. The 1980s and 1990s saw an increasing drive towards governance
forms emphasising privatisation and financialisation of energy projects,
as well as aid conditionality, which coincided with rising concerns
about the environmental impacts of dams [76].
The third transition, from the 2000s onwards, marks a questioning
of the need for, and existence of old forms of transnational energy aid
assemblages themselves. New financiers, such as China, India, and
Brazil, entered the global energy scene, shifting the playing field from
the conventional north-south divide to a more multipolar terrain.
Rather than donors and recipients, ‘partnerships’ has emerged as the
new consensus term, suggesting a horizontal and complex set of rela-
tions [77]. Aid has morphed from being patronising charity to being
seen as foreign public investment, with the emergence of partnerships
and a concomitant de-politicisation of development [78]. In the context
of these broad shifts, how have transnational assemblages of energy aid
shaped the emergence of particular energy imaginaries in Nepal and
Tanzania?
A striking feature that emerges from this complex transnational
trilateral case study is the sharply contrasting trajectories that unfolded
over time. In Nepal, early endeavours by the Norwegians to help es-
tablish a bottom-up-driven indigent energy sector gave way, rather
abruptly, to an emphasis on facilitating private sector involvement,
reflecting the Norwegian shift towards framing energy largely as an
abstract commodity. The hydropower as ‘white gold’ imaginary, with
its potential state-unifying force, was thus emasculated, as the ‘trig-
gering moment’ of opening up for privatisation caused hydropower to
become primarily a vehicle for private investment-induced, export-or-
iented revenue earnings, whilst largely stripping it of any association
with state unification and developmentalism. The energy landscape
subsequently evolved into a state characterised by chaotic plurality,
with everyone scrambling to position themselves to get a share of the
‘white gold’.
Tanzania offers a radically different story. There, the early
Norwegian attempts as a donor were to embark on developing the
grandiose Stiegler's Gorge project, fuelling an energy imaginary of hy-
dropowered industrialisation that meshed well with their domestic
experience. This contrasted sharply with the small-scale, capacity-or-
iented approach initially taken in Nepal. The energy imaginary of hy-
dropowered industrialisation aligned with the visions of Tanzania's
political leadership in the early years of independence, supported
through the modus operandi of nurturing close relations between the
consultancy sector and aid agencies. While the size of the projects was
later scaled down, the state-centric focus remained strong, and was
reinforced through the coming to power of the autocratic-minded John
Magufuli, who went on to revive the megaproject Stiegler's Gorge.
Tracing such changing assemblages over time draws attention to the
complex web of actors and discourses at work in the countries under
study, and helps to deepen our understanding of the factors and forces
that shaped the unfolding processes. Norway's forays into Nepal in the
early years of aid-giving were characterised by the vision and mis-
sionary zeal of Hoftun, drawing on the assemblages of Norwegian
educational institutions specialising in hydropower engineering and the
discourse of incrementalist bottom-up development that drove Hoftun's
work. Those efforts helped create an alternative vision for Nepal's fu-
ture than the dominant ‘white gold’ narrative existing at the time. The
turning point came when Statkraft was brought in to help with the
Khimti project. By that time, in the early 1990s, the Norwegian do-
mestic economy was struggling, not least the energy sector.
This reality was reflected in the shifting discourse on development
that increasingly integrated the interests of security, foreign policy, and
development co-operation and the interests of business, reframing hy-
dropower as an abstract commodity. While all three countries were in
the grip of the ‘global form’ of neoliberalism [11] in the early 1990s,
this unfolded in distinctly different ways, partly due to the contingent
nature of the assemblages present in each context. Nepal went from
being a benefactor of Norwegian grants and goodwill to becoming a
showcase and stepping-stone for its corporate actor to enter the Asian
markets and strengthening Norway's self-image as a world player in the10 He served as Minister of Energy and Minerals from 2012 to 2015.
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hydropower sector.
While Statkraft's lawyers were busy moulding Nepal's legal frame-
work, the pressure to privatise was much more muted in Tanzania.
There, it was the World Bank that pressed for privatisation, and though
supported by Norway through multilateral grants, the attitude was a
very different one. Again, through the contingencies of history, as-
semblages were dominated by an aid agency-consultancy complex
embedded in the energy imaginary of hydropowered industrialisation
to construct a strong, modern state. This was to be brought about
through the support of Scandinavian, including Norwegian, engineering
consultants cushioned by low-risk aid funding. The different natures of
the assemblages in these countries arguably exerted a degree of influ-
ence on the perceptions about what sources of energy and forms of
energy governance would foster development [1].
The socio-political contexts – the institutions, logics, values and
visions – within which these transnational aid assemblages operated,
were quite disparate, and to varying degrees these meshed with, re-
sponded, and resisted the presence of such assemblages. Nepal in the
early 1990s was a fledgling and fragile democracy, with a weak bu-
reaucracy and an administration that was easily pushed around by
experienced corporate lawyers. A fragmented political landscape
characterised by continuous infighting and instability meant that there
were ample ‘soft spaces’ for serving the interests of private investors.
Whereas most efforts had hitherto been state-led, now the door was
prised open to let private actors in, resulting in a burgeoning plethora of
new stakeholders in the energy sector. Thus, the ‘soft spaces’ that
abound in the context of Nepal's weak bureaucracy and traditions of
strong local collective action meant that there was space for more di-
versity and alternative energy pathways. The country became a la-
boratory for opening up for private investment to facilitate the pursuit
of the ‘white gold’.
The dynamics towards private sector participation and neoliber-
alism are structurally dependent not only on donors’ conditions and
visions, but also on the spaces and dynamics of state-society relations
amongst which these assemblages are constituted. This was clearly
evident in Tanzania, where the visions of socialist former president
Julius Nyerere resonated with donor actors long after his departure, and
the ideas of state-led development in the energy landscape remained
the leitmotif of Norwegian involvement. But while Magufuli sought to
wean the country off donors, his decision to revive the Stiegler's Gorge
project (based on the 1973 feasibility study conducted by the
Norwegian consultants) clearly highlights the inherent path de-
pendencies, bringing “to light a particular local history of contact with
politico-economic interventionism, which structures current behaviour
patterns, at least in part” [79, p. 139]. It also underscores the material
and spatial dimensions of energy resources and infrastructure, and how
energy infrastructures are tightly coupled with national imagination,
given the way they “compose and materialise the territory of the state”
[1, p. 4].
These trajectories also point to the partially conflicting images of
the Norwegian energy and aid assemblages. The contrast between the
eagerness to use the soft spaces of the weak Nepali bureaucracy to
experiment with investment-led initiatives and the more stoical em-
phasis on supporting state institutions and images of state-led energy
development in Tanzania is remarkable. Whereas Tanzania was domi-
nated by the large-scale export of people and ‘knowhow’ and modernist
visions of nation-building though high-risk megaprojects, these ran
counter to the efforts in Nepal that were initially inspired by more in-
crementalist development ideas, eventually subsumed by explicit
commercial interests, and there was apparently little conscious attempt
to make these assemblages cohere [26].
These particular transnational assemblages of Norwegian actors and
ideas co-existed and jostled for space with a host of other constellations
of actors and influences, and it is impossible to tease out direct causal
links between the presence of certain actors, given the multiple co-ex-
istences and distributed nature of power [80]. However, it does invite
reflection on the possibilities of alternative pathways - what if there had
been more emphasis on decentralised approaches in Tanzania, and a
more active fostering of energy democracy [see e.g. 81]? What if re-
gional development initiatives had focused on multipurpose dam pro-
jects more sensitive to local needs of irrigation and flood control [46]?
Had efforts in the past been geared towards more decentralised, and
incrementalist ideals, it might be that the country's energy sector would
have been in a very different place.
For Nepal, it invites imagining how things might have turned out if
Hoftun's early efforts to create an indigent energy sector had been
consolidated instead of being eclipsed. Nepal has a strong history and
tradition of collective action, and it could have proved a fertile ground
for more bottom-up approaches, rather than the export-led vision that
has maintained a firm grip on the popular imagination. While engaging
in such counterfactual thought experiments is a fraught exercise, it
helps us to underscore the value of historical and comparative ap-
proaches in highlighting dynamics that are often obscured, and to
opening up space to reflect on possibilities that tend to be overlooked
by taken-for-granted, present-day ideas about spatial relations and
realities.
8. Conclusion
In untangling the complex histories of energy development through
this long-term, comparative perspective of energy imaginaries and
transnational assemblages in Norway, Nepal, and Tanzania, we have
drawn attention to how assembalges of particular actors and discourses
shaped energy imaginaries in diverse ways. Such efforts to tease out the
webs of influence and shifting topographies of power asymmetries over
time are helpful in questioning realities that are often seen as fixed, and
reflecting on notions of space and national identities [1].
Our discussion of these divergences demonstrates how the shifts of
power “that are neither centred nor radically dispersed in pattern, come
into play with different outcomes in different times and places” [82, p.
154]. The comparison of how these transnational energy aid assem-
blages unfolded in two contrasting settings brings out a complex story
of overlaps and contradictions, and of energy imaginaries that took
radically different forms. While one clearly discerns the gradual fading
of Northern donor dependency by the construction of alternative net-
works and policies, and the rise of other emerging economies that
provide alternative partnering opportunities, the ways in which these
interventions have left indelible marks is brought to light. Conceiving of
donor-recipient relations as transnational assemblages situated within
national socio-political contexts and larger global discursive trends al-
lows for a better understanding of how particular constellations of ac-
tors and discourses were at work in shaping energy imaginaries and
trajectories of development.
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